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abstract
I address the issue of the unity of social ontology despite the extreme variety of social entities: groups, 
money, promises, governments, laws, etc. Then, I focus on Gilbert’s account of social ontology as an 
ontology specifically dealing with groups as plural subjects, and face with Gilbert’s concept of shared 
values as values of plural subjects created by joint commitment. I argue that Gilbert’s account of 
shared values is a cognitivist and extrinsic one: it neglects the specific role of values for the constitution 
of plural subjects and considers values neither as a necessary nor as a sufficient condition for social 
unity. I suggest that, unlike Gilbert and the main trend in the contemporary social ontological debate, 
phenomenology provides an axiology that can allow to account adequately for values and to understand 
values’ crucial role for social unity. I discuss Scheler’s dividing vs. sharing values thesis and mention 
Schapp’s collective values thesis. Finally I address the question of the collective feeling value.
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THE PLURAL SUBJECT APPROACH TO SOCIAL ONTOLOGY AND THE SHARING VALUES ISSUE
Social entities, which pervade more and more our everyday life, are extremely various. 
Examples of social entities are: driver licences, taxes, euro notes, credit cards, bus tickets, 
judicial systems, health insurances, penal codes, theatres, governments, symphonic 
orchestras, walks together, football teams, friends groups, philosophical societies, marital 
couples, promises, marriage proposals, concert performances, elections, governing body 
sessions etc.
All of these entities are very different from one another. Yet they represent the object of 
one discipline: social ontology. Social ontology’s origins go back to the beginning of the last 
century – the expression “social ontology” occurs for the first time in Edmund Husserl’s 1910 
manuscript entitled “Soziale Ontologie und Descriptive Soziologie” [Social Ontology and 
Descriptive Sociology].1 However, social ontology’s flowering and development started just in 
the last thirty years in the domain of philosophical and social science research.
Today social ontology’s reception in academia is quite accomplished: social ontology is a 
discipline which is taught in universities; there are social ontology societies, journals of social 
ontology have been founded, and the like.2
Despite the extreme heterogeneity of social entities we deal with in our everyday life, I claim 
that there are at least two features which essentially individuate social entities and distinguish 
them from other classical ontological types, such as natural entities and ideal entities. These 
two features are:
(i) Ontological dependence on intentionality;
(ii) Normativity.3
Social entities existentially depend on individuals’ intentionality (at least two individuals are 
required) both for their creation and for their maintenance and cessation. Without beliefs, 
perceptions, desires, intentions, memories, feelings and actions relating to social entities, 
social entities would not exist. Let us consider some examples. 
1 Husserl 1910, pp. 98-104.
2 See the International Social Ontology Society (ISOS), the Journal of Social Ontology, the European Network on Social Ontology 
(ENSO), the Collective Intentionality Conference.
3 I delt with these two essential features of social entities (ontological dependence on intentionality and normativity) 
in De Vecchi 2012. On this topic see Searle 2010 and Thomasson 2009.
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The promise I did, and its corresponding claim and obligation, are created by my social act of 
promising; and they will cease to exist only when I satisfy my promise by the corresponding-
realizing action. The underground ticket I bought and validated to go to the university 
would not exist without our collective beliefs according to which that piece of paper is an 
underground ticket; if we would collectively stop to believe that that piece of paper is an 
underground ticket, then the underground ticket would cease to exist. Parliaments would not 
exist without parliamentarians, who let the parliaments live trough their actions and acts, and 
without citizens who elect other citizens as parliamentarians.
Thus, social entities ontologically depend on individuals’ intentionality, just like psychic 
natural entities (e.g. feelings) and non-natural physical entities (e.g. artifacts), and unlike 
physical natural entities (e.g. trees) and ideal entities (e.g. numbers). 
Psychic entities like the pain I feel in my leg for my skiing fall, or the joy I feel getting a good 
piece of news about a dear friend of mine, or social entities like the request I made to my friend 
or the taxes I paid, or physical non-natural entities like the seat of the underground on which I sit 
or the building where I give my lectures, all these are entities which depend on individuals and 
on their capacity to be bearers of intentional states and agents of intentional acts and actions.
Physical natural entities, like trees and mountains, exist independently of individuals and 
their intentionality about them: this Californian oak exists independently of the fact that I 
contemplate its beauty; Mont Blanc exists independently of the fact that I ski on Mont Blanc.
Social entities are essentially normative entities. Normativity essentially individuates social 
entities and distinguishes them from other entities, like artifacts and works of art which, like 
social entities, depend on individuals’ intentionality.
Now, the issues that need to be addressed are: what does “normativity” mean when referred to 
social entities? Why are social entities normative entities?
“Normativity” has many meanings and it may be predicable of other entities which are not 
specifically social entities, for instance and above all, moral entities like moral laws, moral 
judgments, moral actions. So, we have to inquiry into the specificity of social normativity: 
What do I mean by “normative” social entities? What kind of normativity distinctively 
characterizes social entities? 
Social entities imply obligations, rights, duties, claims, permissions, authorizations, licenses, 
awards, commitments, requirements etc. Social entities are bearers of “deontic powers” – I 
will adopt here Searle’s very convincing concept (and neologism).4
Let us consider some examples.
Promising implies a promisor’s obligation and promisee’s claim. A university professor has the 
obligation to give her lectures, according to her work contract with her university, and she has 
the right to examine her students and evaluate them. Your invitation to your party authorizes 
me to come to your party. Two friends who decide to go the Picasso Museum together are 
committed to go together to the Picasso Museum. Train tickets entitle us to travel with a certain 
train, directed to a certain destination, on a specific day; if we travel on this train without the 
corresponding ticket, we would be liable to penalty.
All of these kinds of obligations, authorizations, commitments, rights, etc. are not moral, as 
such. For instance, two criminals, who have committed themselves to bring about a certain 
criminal action, are consequently the bearers of such commitment, independently of the fact 
that the content of such commitment is immoral.5
4 See Searle 1995 and 2010.
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I suggest that it is possible and also needed to put the extreme variety of social entities into 
order. I try to do it, and identify three kinds of social entities:
(i) Social objects: they are specifically objects such as driver licences, train tickets, euro notes, 
credit cards, car insurances, laws, etc.
(ii) Social subjects: they are specifically collective entities such as symphonic orchestras, 
governments, societies, football teams, marital couples, groups of friends, etc.
(iii) Social acts, events and processes: social acts such as requesting, promising, promulgating 
legal provisions; social actions and events such as cooperation activities (e.g. concert 
performances); social processes such as election or the procedure of the constitution of a state. 
These different kinds of social entities are essentially connected to one another. For instance, 
social objects such as laws would not exist without social acts such as law-making acts 
performed by the parliaments as collective subjects. Social subjects such as symphonic 
orchestras would not exist without social objects such as job contracts, which define the 
position of each single musician in the orchestra, without concert performances and without 
the cooperative activity of playing together.
Social ontological theories at our disposal on the market provide accounts of social reality 
which tend to deal specifically with just one of these kinds of social entities. Just to mention 
some few examples: Searle and his account of social objects such as money (Searle 1995, 2010); 
Bratman and his account of social actions such as shared intentions and cooperative activities 
(Bratman 2014); List-Pettit and their account of social subjects in terms of group agency (List & 
Pettit 2011); Gilbert and her account of social subjects in terms of plural subjects (Gilbert 1989, 
2013).
I suggest that Margaret Gilbert’ social ontology is therefore an ontology of social subjects, and, 
more precisely, of “plural subjects” – in her terminology.
I argue that Gilbert’s social ontology of plural subjects is impressive, and it is fundamentally 
and appropriately characterized by an original existential approach. Gilbert speaks of her 
social ontology as a “general project of understanding the terms in which human lives are 
lived” (Gilbert 2013, p. 2). “What puts you in a position to use the collective ’we‘? One cannot 
hope fully to understand the human condition without an answer to this question” (Gilbert 
2013, pp. 5-6). Such existential connotation, which is specific to Gilbert’s social ontology, 
strikes positively because of its rarity in the contemporary social ontological debate as well as 
because of its appropriateness to “the thing itself” (to the proper matter of social ontology). In 
the end, social ontology is an ontology of the existence, i.e. of the human condition, since the 
experiences of the collective we (that is, what we live together with other human beings) are 
central for the existence of every human being.
Nevertheless, Gilbert’s ontology of plural subjects does not adequately account for values. I 
argue that, astonishingly enough, Gilbert neglects the specific role of values for the quality of 
“the human condition” and for the quality of the existence of human beings in the social world.
Values constitute neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the creation of plural 
subjects; only as (one of the possible) objects of a joint commitment, values become “shared 
collective values” or “collective values” which unify and bind people together constituting 
plural subjects (Gilbert 2005).
the present issue), Miller 2014 and 2015 (in the present issue), Searle 2010, chapter V, Reinach 1913, § 2.
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In any case, the removal of values is, after all, a constant feature of the contemporary social 
ontological debate.
In the following part of my talk, I outline Gilbert’s plural subjects account of shared values and 
then sketch some features of a different account of values, that of phenomenology; according 
to the phenomenological account of values, I try to show that values play a crucial role both 
for the creation and wellbeing of plural subjects.
I suggest that, unlike Gilbert and the main trend in the contemporary social ontological 
debate, social ontology should provide an account of values which focuses 
(i) on the specific nature of values and 
(ii) on essentially collective values such as solidarity or justice.
I also suggest that phenomenology could provide some important and fruitful insights for such 
account.
I outline Gilbert’s account of shared values. It represents a perspective on values which is quite 
typical in the contemporary social ontological debate. Two features of Gilbert’s account of 
shared values are typical of the way in which values are considered by social ontology today: a 
cognitivist account of values and an extrinsic account of values.
Gilbert proposes a cognitivist account of values: values are the objects of beliefs.
In order that one have values, then, one must have beliefs or opinions. More 
specifically, one must have beliefs or opinions to the effect that some item or items 
have a certain value (Gilbert 2005 (2013), pp. 183-184).
Consequently,
The question about the nature of shared values will then be understood as a question 
about shared beliefs or opinions to the effect that some item or items have a certain value 
(Gilbert 2005 (2013), p. 184).
According to the cognitivist account of values, the specific nature or matter of values is 
not taken into consideration. Values are the object of beliefs just as anything else could be 
the object of beliefs. There is neither an inquiry into the specific being of values nor into a 
specific kind of intentionality that could grasp values directly (vs. the phenomenological 
intrinsic account of values: values are qualities which are directly grasped by “feeling value” 
[wertfühlen], that is, values are felt, see infra § 3).
Because of these two features, values do not play a significant role in the formation of social 
groups (and, consequently, in Gilbert’s social ontology in general).
In her account Gilbert addresses the issue of whether shared values can be:
- either a necessary or sufficient condition, 
- both conditions 
- neither of the conditions 
for the existence of social groups.
Gilbert’s answer is that shared values are not a necessary condition for social groups, and that 
they can be a sufficient condition only “if sharing values [is] construed according to the plural 
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All joint commitments are of the same form. X and Y (and Z and so on) are jointly 
committed to do something as a body. Here “doing something” is construed broadly 
enough so as to include believing that such-and-such and feeling thus-and-so. What is it 
to do something “as a body”?
The joint commitment in the case we are considering is a commitment to believe as a 
body that some item I has a certain value v (Gilbert 2005 (2013), p. 193)
Gilbert argues that only if individuals commit themselves to believe jointly that a particular 
item I has a certain value v, such value v is a sufficient condition for the creation of social 
unity and of a “plural subject”.
In the case in which values are shared in the joint commitment modus, Gilbert speaks properly 
of “collectively shared values” or, more briefly of “collective values” (Gilbert 2005 (2013), p. 
200). In other words values are here (cognitively) shared in a genuine collective way, that is in 
a we-mode, by a “plural subject”– and not in a summative or singularist way.
According to Gilbert, people can be jointly committed in a variety of ways. Whatever this way 
is, the result of the joint commitment is always the creation of a “plural subject”.
[People] can be jointly committed not only to believing as a body that such-and-such, but 
also to accepting or pursuing a goal as a body, to accepting as a body that A is to be done in 
circumstances C, and more. In my technical terminology those who are jointly committed 
to X-ing as a body constitute the plural subject of X-ing (Gilbert 2005 (2013), p. 197).
Therefore, concerning the necessary condition,
It would seem that such [collective] values are not necessary, however, for social unity. 
A plural subject, founded on a joint commitment, need not be the subject of values as 
opposed to other beliefs, rules of the fiat form, and so on” (Gilbert 2005 (2013), p. 204).
In other words, collective values can be a condition for social unity and for the creation 
of a plural subject, just as collective beliefs or collective rules can be a condition for it. 
According to Gilbert, the only fundamental condition for social unity and plural subject is 
that values, beliefs, rules, emotions etc. be shared in virtue of a joint commitment (see Gilbert 
2014, on collective emotions). If values, beliefs, rules, emotions etc. are the object of a joint 
commitment, then, in virtue of such joint commitment such values, beliefs, rules, emotions, 
etc., are collective values, beliefs, rules, emotions of a plural subject, and they bring forth 
social unity.
According to Gilbert, sharing values, beliefs, emotions etc. in the joint commitment modus“ […] 
unifies people, it binds them together, and it provides them with the standing to intervene in one 
another’s lives”(Gilbert 2005 (2013), p. 206; italic mine).
Therefore, collective values, beliefs, emotions, etc. (i.e. values, beliefs, emotions etc. which 
are shared in the joint commitment modus) are a sufficient condition for the creation of social 
unity and plural subjects because they
- unify and
- bind the participants together
by giving them the standing to intervene in one another’s lives, more precisely to make 
demands on one another and to rebuke one another in order that each participant acts 
conforming to the joint commitment in question.
2.3.4 
Joint commitment: 

















Gilbert’s account of shared values does not value values with regard to their specific nature. 
Values are considered as any other possible object of beliefs and as any other possible object of 
joint commitments. As objects of a joint commitment, values become shared collective values 
(or collective values) and constitute a sufficient condition for the creation of social unity and 
plural subjects.
This is just an extrinsic account of values and of shared values. Gilbert does not inquire 
into the specific nature of values and their role in the constitution of social unity and 
plural subjects. For instance, she does not address the question if there are sharable values 
and not-sharable values per se. Moreover, she does not take into consideration the role of 
essentially collective values such as solidarity for the wellbeing of a collective of persons, 
and consequently, for its stability and persistence. All of the “social unity game” played by 
Gilbert takes place on the field of what can entitle people to intervene in each other life 
in order to unify them and bind them together. This issue of intervention is not a specific 
issue of collective values, but rather a general issue, common to collective values, beliefs, 
emotions etc. In conclusion, the specific contribution of values in the creation, maintenance 
in existence (stability and persistence) and quality of the existence of plural subjects is not 
taken into account.
I argue that phenomenology provides an axiology (i.e. a theory of values which deals with 
their specific ontological nature) that can allow us to account adequately for values and to 
understand their crucial place in the social world.
I make two points:
(i) Scheler’s axiology (Scheler 1913/1923, 1913/1927), his inquiry into the specific nature 
of values and the dividing vs. sharing values thesis: the more divisible values are, the less 
sharable they are; and the converse: the less divisible values are, the more sharable they 
are.
(ii) The collective values thesis (Schapp 1930): there are values which are essentially collective 
(vs. individual values).
These points should suggest a track for an alternative answer to the issue of unifying and 
binding people together which is, as we have just seen, Gilbert’s main issue about the possibility 
conditions for social unity.
Here I limit myself to sketching some essential features of values which, according to Scheler’s 
axiology, ground the thesis of dividing values vs. sharing values which I present.
(i) Feeling value: Values are the specific and direct object of a particular kind of affective 
intentionality: feeling value [wertfühlen]. Feeling value is to be distinguished both from 
perceiving [wahrnehmen], which is a cognitive act, and from emotions or sensations, which 
the act of feeling values can give rise to.
(ii) Realism about values: Values are material qualities which exist independently of 
individuals’ intentionality, and, therefore, are not reducible to mental phenomena like 
sensations, emotions or beliefs (as, instead, happens in Gilbert’s account).
(iii) Values and goods: Values are not reducible to goods, the things which are bearers of 
values (valuable things). The distinction between values and goods is very important for 
preserving a transcendence of the type of the value with respect to its instantiations in 
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certain instantiation of friendship in certain bearers.6
(iv)  Hierarchy of values: There are “superior” and “inferior” values: values can belong to 
different spheres, which from the lower to the higher constitute a hierarchy of values:
– values of the “sensibly agreeable” [Werte des “sinnnlich Angenehmen”]
– vital values [Lebenswerte]
– person values [Personwerte]
– values of the holy [Werte des Heiligen].7
Among others, one criterion for values hierarchy is the divisibility of values: the less values are 
divisible, i.e. the less values must be divided in participation by several, in order to be grasped 
by several participants, the higher values are; and the converse: the more values are divisible, 
i.e. the more values must be divided in participation by several, in order to be grasped by 
several participants, the lower values are.
There is no question about the fact that values are “higher” the less they are divisible 
[teilbar], that is, the less they must be divided [geteilt] in participation by several (Scheler 
1913/1927, p. 110; En. Tr., p. 93).
Now, I argue for the following thesis: the more divisible values are, the less sharable they are. And 
the converse: the less divisible values are, the more sharable they are.
The fact that the participation [Teilnahme] of several in “material” goods is possible 
only by dividing [Teilung] these goods (e.g., a piece of cloth, a loaf of bread) has this final 
phenomenological basis: the values of the sensibly agreeable [Werte des sinnlich Angenehmen] 
are clearly extensive in their essence, and their felt experiences occur as localized and 
as extensive in the body. For example, the agreeableness of sweet, etc., is spread over 
sugar, and the corresponding sensible feeling-state over the “tongue”.
[…] It is therefore essentially impossible [wesensgesetzlich ausgeschlossen] for one and 
the same value of the values-series of the “sensibly agreeable” to be enjoyed by several 
beings without the division of its bearer and of the value itself. For this reason there are 
also, in the essence of this values-modality, “conflicts of interest” relative to the striving 
for a realization of these values, and relative to their enjoyment […]. This also implies 
that it belongs to the essence of these values to divide, not to unite [trennen, und nicht 
vereinen], the individuals who feel them (Scheler 1913/1927, p. 110; En. Tr., p. 93).
The lowest sphere of values is that of the values of the sensibly agreeable [Werte des “sinnnlich 
Angenehmen”], for example the “agreeableness of sweet”. Such kind of values can be grasped 
by more individuals together only if their bearers (the material goods, in which they are 
embodied) are divided among the individuals bacause the values of the sensibly agreeable are 
essentially characterized by extension [Ausdehnung] and divisibility [Teilbarkeit]. Therefore, 
values of the lowest sphere (such as the sweet of a food or also the warmth of a blanket) 
essentially divide and not unify the individuals, because, in order to be enjoyed by a plurality of 
6 See Scheler 1913/1927, First part, First Section «Materiale Wertethik und Guter-Respektive Zweckethik», §1 «Guter 
und Werte».
7 See Scheler 1913/1927, § 3, pp. 110-111. About these features of Scheler’s account of values, see Mulligan 2009 and 
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individuals, they have to be divided among the individuals and individuals have to compete 
with one another to grasp the values. So, the more divisible values are, the less sharable they are.
In strict contrast to this [values of the sensibly agreeable] there stands a “work of art”, 
for example, which is “indivisible” [unteilbar] and of which there is no “piece”. […]
The most extreme opposite of these values [the values of the sensibly agreeable], the 
values of the “holy” [das Heilige], of “cognition” [Erkenntis], and of the “beautiful” [das 
Schöne], etc., as well as their corresponding spiritual feeling-states [geistige Gefühlen], 
have a totally different character. There is no participation in extension and divisibility 
with these values; nor is there any need to divide their bearers if they are to be felt and 
experienced by any number of beings. A work of spiritual culture can be simultaneously 
apprehended [gleichzeitig erfasst] by any number of beings and can be felt and enjoyed in 
its value, for it lies in the essence of values of this kind to be sharable [mitteilbar] without 
limit and without any division and diminution […]. Nothing unites [vereint] beings more 
immediately and intimately than the common worship and adoration of the holy, which 
by its nature excludes a “material” bearer, though not a symbolic one. […] It lies in the 
essence of the intention toward the holy to unite [einen] and bind together [verbinden] (Scheler 
1913/1927, p. 111; En. Tr. pp. 93-94, slightly modified).
On the contrary, superior values (for instance “person values” [Personwerte] such as the 
beauty of a work of art, the knowledge, or, above all, values of the holy) can be grasped by a 
plurality of individuals without being participated in extension and divisibility and without 
their bearers being divided. The beauty of a work of art is not divisible and there is no piece 
of a work of art. A work of art can be simultaneously grasped by a plurality of individuals and 
its value can be felt and enjoyed by such plurality, since it belongs to the essence of superior 
values to be “sharable without limit and without any division and diminution”. Moreover it 
lies in the essence of some superior values (especially the values of the holy) to unify and bind 
together the people who feel and enjoy them.
Therefore, the less divisible values are, i.e. the less values must be divided in participation by 
several, in order to be grasped and felt by several participants, the more they can be felt and 
enjoyed by several individuals together, that is the more sharable they are.
The main idea I argue for is that there are values which are sharable and values which are not. 
Sharable values are fundamental for the quality of the existence of human beings and for the 
creation of social unity (groups, societies, communities, etc.): sharing values, which are crucial 
for the development and flourishing of human beings such as the beauty of a work of art, the 
knowledge and the truth (think of a group of scientists), the justice of a law, unifies people and 
even binds them together.
Therefore, this phenomenological insight into values provides a track for an account of the 
problem of unifying and binding people together (in order to bring about plural subjects: 
groups, collective of persons etc. vs. mere aggregates), which is different from Gilbert’s 
account focusing just on the title people have to intervene in each other lives.
The phenomenological account implies that certain specific values–and not others–are 
sharable and that, once shared, they unify the people who share them: for instance sharing 
the justness of a law, brings about unity among people. Thus, people are not unified only by 
and through the standing to intervene in each other lives (Gilbert’s account); rather, people 
are also unified by and through the experience of sharing some values which essentially and 
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Moreover, the phenomenological account of values not only focuses on the distinction 
between values which are sharable and values which are not. It even suggests that, among 
sharable values, there are values which are essentially collective: as shown by Wilhelm Schapp 
(1930), we have to distinguish between values which are individual and values which are 
collective, that is between values which can be enjoyed by only one individual, on the one 
hand, and values which are essentially collective, on the other hand, for they need to be shared 
and enjoyed by individuals together in order to exist and to be realized. Think, for instance, to 
the solidarity of behaviour with respect to others, the justness of a law.8
The collective values thesis provides a promising path for answering the question of binding 
people together, the question of the social bondage, since it seems to me that collective values 
necessarily imply a bond among the people who share them: without such a bond, collective 
values can be neither enjoyed nor realized.
Now, the last issue I address concerns the very concept of sharing values: what does sharing 
values mean? Which phenomena do exemplify the sharing of values?
According to Gilbert’s joint commitment account, sharing values implies that values are 
shared in the plural subject mode created by joint commitment. This is a genuine collective 
we-mode, i.e. not a singularist or a summative way of sharing.
In the phenomenological scenario I have just mentioned, in which sense of sharing sharable 
values (values which can be communicated and shared without limit and division of the goods 
in which they are embedded) can be shared? According to Scheler people can share values lato 
sensu in different ways corresponding to different kinds of co-feeling. However only one way 
of sharing values represents a genuine collective way of sharing values.9
(i) Collective feeling [Miteinanderfühlen] value: we-mode
The only one genuine way of feeling value together is collective feeling. It is, say, the case 
of two artists who feel together the beauty of the work of art they are creating, or of two 
parents who feel together the love for their child. In these cases, individuals share values 
in a genuine collective we-mode: it is not reducible to the I-form plus mutual or common 
knowledge (I feel the (sharable) value x and I know that you feel the same value x, etc.), that is, 
it is not reducible to merely individual experiences plus reciprocal knowledge. Why? Because 
collective feeling value is constituted by the deep interdependence and co-regulation of 
individuals’ experiences and by their reciprocal relation to each other.10 Therefore, collective 
feeling value is a very important moment of groups of individuals such as couples, families and 
communities which are deeply unified and bond together.11
(ii) Co-feeling [Mitfühlen]: I-mode
Simple co-feeling is the case in which, say, artist A feels the disvalue “grotesque” of the work 
of art she is creating together with the artist B; the artist B does not feels herself such disvalue, 
but she may co-feel the feeling the grotesque of the artist A: B sympathizes the feeling the 
grotesque of A.
8  On Schapp’s account of values, see De Vecchi 2016.
9 Scheler presents his taxonomy of co-feeling in Scheler 1913/1923: Part I Fellow Feeling, Section II Classification of the 
phenomena of fellow feeling.
10 See Zahavi (2015: 116-117, 245) who discusses the specificity of “emotional sharing” in Scheler’s account of co-feeling.
11 A further and deeper analysis of Scheler’s collective feeling account would be needed here, but for reasons of 
lenght I have to limit myself to the few features I sketched. About this topic, see Schmid 2009, Zahavi 2015, Szanto 









In this case, values are shared not in a genuine collective way, not in a we-mode, but just in a 
singularist way. B co-feels the value felt by A, and so B shares the same value of A. But A may 
even not be aware of such co-feeling and sharing.
Co-feeling is grounded in the refeeling (Nachfühlen).
(iii) Refeeling [Nachfühlen] value: grounding co-feeling value
It often happens that a value, e.g., the value of a work of art, comes to us in a more 
adequate form of giveness only trough a refeeling of the feeling [Nachfühlen des fühlens] 
of the value concerned; and we often realize through this that our ability to feel 
[Fühlfähigkeit] the type of value in question is very narrow indeed (Scheler 1913/1927, p. 
249; En. Tr., p. 243)
I may grasp the value of the beauty of a work of art through my feeling of the feeling 
[Nachfüehlen] of the beauty value felt by another person: this is the case of empathy. In other 
words, in the case of superior values as the beauty (and not in the case of inferior values of the 
sensibly agreeable) I may increase my feeling of values through the capacity other people have 
to grasp certain values which I was not able to grasp. 
In such case, I grasp the feeling value (e.g. the beauty) felt by the other. This does not imply 
that I endorse such feeling value. Refeeling value is just an act by which I learn the feeling 
value of others. Then, I may feel such value personally and share it. But I may also do not feel 
such value personally.
Therefore, in the case of refeeling value, values may be either co-felt or not-co-felt. If I 
personally endorse and feel the value felt by another person, I co-feel such value: i.e. I 
sympathize such value with the other person. Here values which are co-felt are shared in 
I-mode and not in we-mode. If I just limit myself to grasp the feeling value of the other person 
unless feeling such value personally, then no value is shared.
(iv) Contagion [Ansteckung]: pseudo-we-mode
Another possible case of co-feeling is the case of contagion: this is a pseudo collective sharing 
values. Contagion is a form of co-feeling which plays a very crucial role in the creation of 
social groups such as masses in which individuals identify themselves with impersonal 
collective forms of sociality. For instance: if I belong to a certain tradition, culture, etc., then 
I may be swayed by that tradition or culture, but I may be not aware of this contagion. In 
this case, I feel certain values characterizing that tradition or culture and I think that such 
values are personally mines and that they are grounded in me, because I identify myself with 
that tradition (but I am not aware of it). I may feel hate for a certain population because I 
belong to a population that traditionally hates that population; but I believe that such hate 
is grounded in me, and I am not aware that it is derived by the population I belong to. In 
other words, there is the creation of a pseudo-we, in which individuals are merged one in the 
other and the individuals’ identities are not preserved, as instead it is the case in the genuine 
collective feeling.12
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